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Abstract
In the last decades, several European health systems have abandoned their vertically integrated health care
in favour of some form of managed competition (MC), either in a centralised or decentralised format.
However, during a pandemic, MC may put health systems under additional strain as they are designed
to follow some form of ‘organisational self-interest’, and hence face reduced incentives for both provider
coordination (e.g. temporary hospital close down, change in the case-mix), and information sharing. We
illustrate our argument using evidence for the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak in Italy during March and
April 2020, which calls for the development of ‘coordination mechanisms’ at times of a health emergency.
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1. Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic has been responsible for around one million deaths worldwide so far, most
of which have taken place in hospitals and nursing homes. A significant share of hospital staff has
been put in isolation due to contagion in almost every country, and some countries have faced
unexpected congestion in their health services. Strikingly, there are also large variations across
countries – and even across and within regions in the same country – on the extent of service con-
gestion. The unexpectedly large death toll has opened a discussion on how to organise health care
systems to prevent fatalities in the event of a pandemic. The main question is how to improve the
decision-making process as concerns access to care and treatment options under a pandemic.
This question is especially important for Europeanhealth systemsthat, in the quest to improve ‘value
for money’, have replaced vertically integrated models with some form of managed competition (MC)
such as theUnitedKingdom, Spain and Italy to name a few. UnderMC, providers compete for patients
under a regulatory framework set by public health care purchasers (Carlson et al., 2017). The logic
behindMC is that, in the absence of large transaction costs, MC allows reaping the benefits from com-
petition in terms of cost reduction (allocative efficiency) and quality enhancement (Jones and Cullis,
1996). The funding of the system still comes from public budgets, but the provision is left to independ-
ent providers (public and private), whichmake decisions on health care provision guided by ‘organisa-
tional self-interest’ to attract more patients, and ultimately to improve quality of care. Consistently,
the evidence so far suggests that MC delivers efficiency and quality improvements (Gaynor and
Town, 2011; Propper, 2018; Siciliani and Straume, 2019) and some patients benefit from having
more choice of provider (Le Grand, 2009; Costa-Font and Zigante, 2016). However, while this scheme
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may work when most care is supplied on an elective base, an important question to investigate is:
how does managed competition fare during unexpected pandemic events such as COVID-19?
MC encompasses limited incentives for providers to cooperate. With some exceptions, MC
models rely on the assumption that patients’ probabilities of needing health care are independent
of one another, and that the decision to hospitalise a patient does not reduce the probability of
hospitalising other patients (i.e., there are no capacity constraints). Clearly, this assumption does
not hold during a pandemic, when hospitals need to cooperate. Lack of coordination might exert
serious consequences on both the number of contagions and of deaths, depending on the incen-
tives that different MC systems have in place to enhance cooperation. That is, the governance of
MC competition can make a difference in influencing provider coordination at a critical time.
In this paper, we argue that the ‘type’ of MC in place in a health care system can make the
difference during a pandemic. More specifically, it influences how agile providers are in respond-
ing to coordination needs. Whilst ‘centralised’ (or ‘integrated’) MC formats allow health services
(health insurers) to exert control over providers (which is instrumental for swift decision-
making), the same is not true under ‘decentralised’ systems. In other words, what in ‘normal’
times performs well, and potentially delivers ‘value for money’, it might backfire during
pandemics. In what follows we further elaborate on this point by characterising the two main
models of MC. We draw on the evidence of the spread of the disease in Italy and look at its
diverse form of hospitals care delivery across regions (Costa-Font and Greer, 2016). More specif-
ically, we study the governance across different regions that have implemented different forms of
MC to determine which characteristics can make a difference in the management of a pandemic.
A final section concludes and provides policy recommendations.
2. Swift response to the pandemic
The management of the Covid-19 pandemic in Europe has become a test for how responsive health
care providers are to the needs of the population; more specifically, how resilient is the system of
MC in the event of a pandemic. This is especially important when infections take place in hospitals,
since delays in providing timely responses give rise to further infections and fatalities. During a
pandemic, the probability of needing care is clearly interdependent among individuals; hence,
timely health service reaction is the key to reduce the pandemic spread and to treat patients in a
safe environment. Some hospitals need to be swiftly transformed into ‘pandemic wards’, while
others are left for other cases. If all resources are allocated to ‘Covid hospitals’, it might result in
fatal consequences for patients that suffer from other unrelated, but equally serious conditions.
Pandemic wards require a different organisation, even when patients do not need mechanical
ventilation. The type of tests along with the availability of treatments required is rather different
(Garrafa et al., 2020). This is because patients are highly infectious, calling for strict protocols in
their management, and patient choice is hampered by insufficient information on the spread of
contagion. Furthermore, protective equipment should be available for all staff, to avoid weakening
the human resources available to respond to the pandemic. Hence, organisational models based
on the competition without an integrated authority may not provide sufficient incentives for a
swift response, which can result in a delayed reaction and higher fatalities (Mak et al., 2020).
3. Models of managed competition
3.1 Decentralised managed competition
Unlike centralised MC models, decentralised models require (i) the separation of ‘insurers’ (gen-
erally public insurers in most European countries) from providers, (ii) private providers to supply
services alongside with public ones, and (iii) standardised set of patient choices (e.g. a catalogue
of hospitals available in the area).
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The main mechanism driving allocative efficiency is patient choice (typically guided by some
form of observed quality dimension), which makes providers react by adjusting their quality to
the set prices. In ‘normal times’, the combination of these choices can eventually result in efficient
outcomes if a number of conditions are met: (i) information on quality is available, (ii) information
is used by patients in their decisions, (iii) public providers have incentives to react to
patient choices. The literature clearly emphasises that information and institutional settings are cru-
cial for quality to improve with the degree of competition (Gaynor and Town, 2011; Gutacker et al.,
2016; Siciliani et al., 2017; Dardanoni et al., 2018; Moscelli et al., 2018). In fact, it is patients ability
to exploit the available information on the differences in quality between providers (which makes
them choose the best provider) that eventually allows the system to achieve efficient outcomes
(Eurostat, 2017; Siciliani et al., 2017; Rechel et al., 2018; Levaggi and Levaggi, 2020).
However, the performances of MC may be suboptimal during a pandemic event. Health care
providers are deemed to make important decisions, in a context where incentives are mainly for
them to act following their own organisational self-interest. However, respond to a pandemic, it
is efficient for hospitals to stock and make available personal protective equipment (PPE), to
collaborate with other hospitals in purchasing decisions, as well as to test staff and to define
protocols to deal with infected personnel. However, given that these activities entail extra
costs, hospital managers facing MC (especially in less efficient hospitals) are incentivised to
limit safety procedures, especially when even scientists are unsure about the clinical consequences
of the infection as was clearly (and still is) the case for Covid-19.
Such organisational self-interest can undermine safety, without improving qualiy as patients
cannot obtain information on hospital ‘quality’ concerning the risk of being infected. Relevant
information may in fact reach patients with a considerable delay, which reduces the effectiveness
of actions at the individual level to reduce the contagion. The same logic applies to the purchase
of PPE: uncoordinated purchases might incentivise managers to stock PPE for their own hospital
rather than sharing them with the most exposed providers. The regulator could of course step in
during a pandemic but at the cost of further delay because in a decentralised model it has no
direct day-to-day experience with purchasing medical and safety equipment.
3.2 Centralised managed competition
A centralised system of MC rests on different premises: (i) not all providers are split from the
control of public purchasers (‘insurers’), and (ii) the role of private providers is fairly limited
although they are quite well integrated into the network of public providers. In normal times,
a centralised system might not face the same incentives for efficiency as a decentralised system
(nor the same incentives for the exploitation of potential market failures). In fact, although public
providers can compete for patients, integration in a network may reduce the incentives to outper-
form other hospitals in the network.
In addition, when authority is integrated, health care regulators have a central role in the process
of closing down hospitals, of changing their case mix by imposing the opening of ‘Covid wards’ in
some, and of purchasing PPE. The coordination among providers and the integration among ser-
vices (transfers in and out of nursing homes, providing home care) is supervised by the regulator.
Networks under an integrated authority can reduce the risks of local shortages of PPE. They
can react promptly to reduce contagion at the hospital level by devoting some facilities to the
emergency while leaving other hospitals free to carry on with normal hospital treatments.
4. Managed competition in Italy during the Covid-19 pandemic
One of the most illustrative cases of the trade-off between centralised and decentralised MC is
Italy. This country was the first one to be severely hit in Europe by the Covid-19 pandemic.
To date, the number of official figures has raised to about 276,000 cases and 35,500 deaths. In
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Italy alone, health staff represented about 12% of all cases according to reports of the Istituto
Superiore di Sanità.1 The spread of the contagion has been highly concentrated in few
Northern regions: 60% of the cases are concentrated in Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto.
The Italian NHS is regionally decentralised, and regions can make decisions about the organ-
isation of both inpatient and outpatient care. In particular, since 1992, regions can adopt their
own model of MC. Yet, although most regions preferred a more centralised model (Emilia
Romagna and Veneto), others (Lombardy) opted for more decentralised solutions (Turati, 2013).
Emilia Romagna adopted an MC model based on health care integration, whereby public hos-
pitals are in integrated networks, and the intensity of use of private providers is determined by the
regional authority, which sets quality goals for all the providers. Half the hospital beds are under
the control of the regional health service (Table 1). Emilia Romagna operates using intermediate
purchasing authorities (‘Area Vasta’, literally ‘Extended Area’) between the regional regulator and
the providers, which carry out – in addition to health care purchasing – other functions related to
logistics, information technology, financial administration and human resources.
Another example of centralised MC is the regional health service in Veneto. Patients can
choose between private and public providers, but a centralised authority controls the manage-
ment of public hospitals. About two-thirds of beds are under the control of the regional health
service whether public or private (Table 1). Although in principle hospitals may compete for
patients, most of the competition is among public providers. Similar to Emilia Romagna,
Veneto has a purchasing agency (the so-called ‘Azienda Zero’), which controls the management
and planning of public hospitals, centralises the purchase of medicines and PPE, and carries out
functions related to logistics and human resources. This model, at time of a pandemic, limits the
potential shortages of PPE, and allows the selective lockdown of hospitals when needed.
Lombardy has instead adopted a more decentralised MC model, based on an unambiguous
separation between purchasing and providing functions (Brenna, 2011). Public hospitals have
been transformed into autonomous organisations which compete with private providers. The
regional health service defines the general health care goals, but it is not directly involved in
the supply of care. In 2015, a new reform has enhanced the autonomous role of public hospitals
by further separating purchasers (Aziende Tutela Salute, ATS) from providers (Aziende
Socio-Sanitarie Territoriali, ASST). Each ASST consists of a public hospital that competes with
private providers and a second department that provides (limited) integration between different
levels of care.
In the event of a pandemic such as Covid-19, no hospital bed in Lombardy was under the direct
control of the regional health authority (Table 1), which had to undergo negotiations and redraft
agreements to arrange for the treatment of Covid-19 patients in private hospitals. Lombardy
stepped in to purchase PPE and other devices through the renewed central purchasing authority
(set in July 2019 to support public purchasers across the Region), but it had to compete with
private hospitals. This led to inevitable coordination failures, unnecessary delays in information
sharing between hospitals, and an increased risk of infection for hospital staff (Rosenbaum, 2020).
Although a 6-month national emergency was declared on 31 January 2020 (see the Covid-19
Health Systems Response Monitor2) it had almost no immediate repercussion on the organisation
of health care. This is why the official start of the pandemic in Italy dates to 20 February, when
the first patient tested positive for Covid-19, after being admitted to hospital in Codogno
(Lombardy).
Table 1 shows Covid-19 deaths in the three regions under analyisis during the months of
March and April 2020 and shows that Lombardy had larger fatalities during the pandemic
1See, e.g., https://www.epicentro.iss.it/coronavirus/bollettino/Bollettino-sorveglianza-integrata-COVID-19_7-luglio-2020.
pdf.
2For information and updates see https://www.covid19healthsystem.org/countries/italy/livinghit.aspx?Section=5.1%
20Governance&Type=Section
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than other regions (in March and April 80% of deaths are due to Covid-19). Lombardy exhibited
the highest ratio of deaths per patients infected and a rather low ratio of swabs per inhabitants.
Even when we adjust deaths by inhabitants across all regions in Figure 1, Lombardy appears to be
the region with the largest death rate per inhabitant. This result is even most striking when
observing that the share of the elderly, the group most hit by the virus, is largely comparable
across the three regions. According to official data provided by Istat-Health for all, Lombardy,
Veneto and Emilia Romagna are characterised by about 22–23% of over 65 out of the total popu-
lation in recent years (2016–2018); a similar result is obtained when looking at the share of over
85, 3–4%, across the three regions. These numbers are close to national averages, though the share
is lower in the South. Also, the unemployment rate is quite similar, about 6–7%, well below the
national average of about 11%.
















































For the first three columns the source is the Annuario Statistico del SSN.
aUpdated at 30 April 2020 Source (Istat and ISS, 2020).
bUpdaed at 30 April 2020 Source (Ministero-della- and Salute, 2020).
cUpdate at 1 January 2019 Source Istat.
Figure 1. Deaths per at regional level.
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At the beginning, Lombardy was likely to be initial epicentre. According to a recent study
(Cereda et al., 2020), the virus was certainly around in Lombardy as early as mid-January and
the genetic sequence of the virus that spread in Codogno is different from the one in
Bergamo. This means that the Region was hit from several fronts at the same time; and the
importance of logistics in the local economy (in the area around Bergamo) may have helped
the spread of the virus.
Importantly, the testing policy in Italy has followed different regional strategies, which may
have triggered an increase (decrease) in the death rate since the denominator (the number of peo-
ple infected) in some regions may be far higher than the official number as depicted in Figure 2.
This evidence is consistent with the idea that the decentralised model of MC may have exa-
cerbated the effects of the pandemic, measured in terms of fatalities, in Lombardy (Odone
et al., 2020). Furthermore, quite a few regional health care systems were not able to produce
an effective response to the Covid-19 outbreak in nursing homes (Berloto et al., 2020).
Nursing homes are independent entities with respect to hospitals, which again makes coordin-
ation and information sharing more difficult. Although further statistical analysis might measure
the exact extent of ‘excess mortality’, descriptive evidence points to the disadvantage of decentra-
lised models of MC in times of a pandemic.
5. Conclusions
The unexpected onset of a pandemic changes the principles and mechanisms that drive the
organisation of inpatient care and the design of MC, which is guided by principles of ‘organisa-
tional self-interest’. Although MC may play a role in improving the efficiency and quality of care
during regular times, during a pandemic event, efficiency calls for a swift response to new needs,
and – primarily – information sharing and coordination among health care providers. During the
present pandemic, this has led some countries to respond rather differently (Forman et al., 2020):
some countries have even ‘nationalised’ private health care providers (Ireland and Spain) when
there were not enough beds available. And a call to further re-centralisation was advocated
also in Italy.
Figure 2. Swabs per inhabitant (at regional level).
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In this article, we have discussed both the principles and empirical evidence that define the
organisation of MC in Italy to illustrate the fact that regions that adopted a more centralised
model of MC were more resilient, which in turn might have helped to reduce fatalities.
We show that the way in which MC responds to a pandemic largely depends on its design. In
highly decentralised systems, the risk of coordination failure is very high, as illustrated in
Lombardy. Perhaps the best option available to enhance a swift coordination is to use
Pandemic Plans. These should define a mechanism of information sharing in a timely manner
and allow some functions to be centralised during the pandemic. In contrast, these plans are
less imperative in centralised systems, given that their governance is more amendable to organ-
isational co-operation.
In Italy, a Pandemic Plan was available both at the national as well as at the regional level, but
both levels were not prepared for the unexpected rise of Covid-19 patients. The lesson that
emerges is that the regional organisation of care determined the initial responses to the crisis,
and crucially determined the different outcomes.
Although during good times a more decentralised model of MC might improve health out-
comes, during a pandemic a centralised model appears to help to reduce the number of fatalities.
In fact, while in normal times, recent empirical evidence suggests that the Lombardy model is
more efficient than Emilia Romagna and Veneto (Levaggi et al., 2020), in the present pandemic
the regional system in Lombardy has underperformed relative to the other two regional health
care models. The governance of the Italian health system during the Covid-19 pandemic reveals
a trade-off between what ‘works in regular times’ and what is ‘appropriate during a pandemic’.
If pandemics become recurrent, either a centralised form of MC or some specific interventions
should be designed to allow a swifter reaction to the need for information and coordination. This
carries important lessons for other European countries that have health systems organised
according to a decentralised model of MC.
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